A municipal license tax imposed on a foreign corporation on property sold inside and outside the state but manufactured in the city is not a tax on business transactions or real estate outside the city and therefore does not violate the due process clause.120FootnoteAmerican Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). A State charge on electricity generation also does not infringe the appropriate procedural clause, since it may be necessary to determine the amounts delivered in another jurisdiction as part of its calculation. Utah Power & Light Co. vs. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
A chain store tax at a per-store rate, determined by the number of stores inside and outside the state, is not unconstitutional as a tax in part on things that are not under the jurisdiction of the state. But a state is not allowed to extend its privilege tax to the gross income of a foreign contracting company for the production of equipment outside the tax state, even if the equipment is later installed in the tax state. Unless the activities subject to the tax are carried on within its territorial limits, a state is not permitted to levy such a tax on privileges.121Footnote James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). A.- (a) There is no constitutional prohibition of double taxation in the Philippines. This is something that is not favoured, but is permissible, provided that it does not violate another constitutional requirement, such as.B. the requirement that taxes must be uniform. (Villanueva v. City of Lloilo, G.R.
No. L-262521, 28. December 1968.) The Court expressly annulled only one of those four decisions condemning the multiple taxation of intangible assets. In 1939, in Curry v. McCanless, the Court announced that it departed from the more recent doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment excludes the taxation of any interest in the same intangible asset in more than one state. 108Foot307 U.S. 357, 363 (1939). Noting that this doctrine had never been extended to the field of income tax or applied uniformly in the field of wealth tax, the Court stated that a correct interpretation of the constitutional rules would dictate the following conclusions: Since the beginning of our constitutional system, the control of the person at the place of residence and his duty in that country, Common to all citizens, to help support the government was considered an appropriate constitutional basis for levying a tax on the use and enjoyment of rights on intangible assets, measured by their value. However, if the taxpayer extends his activity in relation to his intangible assets in order to benefit from the protection and benefits of the laws of another State in order to make his property or assets within the reach of the tax collector, the reason for a single place of taxation no longer exists.
[The state of residence] does not, however, deprive the taxpayer`s activities elsewhere of its constitutional jurisdiction over taxation. 109Foot307 U.S. at 366, 367, 368. It was not considered that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would limit or paralyze the power of States to impose.32FootnoteTonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389 (1901); Cass Farm Co.c. Detroit, 181 U.S. 396 (1901).
On the contrary, the purpose of the amendment was to provide state residents with the same protection from arbitrary state laws that interfere with life, liberty, and property as that granted to Congress by the Fifth Amendment. Southwestern Oil Co.c. Texas, 217 USA 114, 119 (1910). If the power to impose exists, the extent of the burden is at the discretion of Parliament, 33FootnoteFox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 99 (1935). and the Court will refrain from imposing a tax solely on the ground that it is excessive.34Footnote Stewart Dry Goods Co.c. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). See also Kelly v.
City of Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881); Chapman v Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135 (1915); Alaska Fish Co.c. Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921); Magnano Co.c. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974). Nor can the constitutionality of taxation depend on whether the taxpayer benefits from the use of funds raised through taxation.35FootnoteNashville, C. & St. L.
Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Carmichael vs. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937). A taxpayer cannot therefore challenge the collection of an income tax on the ground that, when it is put into operation, he returns less income tax to his city than he and his other residents pay. Dane vs. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589 (1921).
Conversely, if a non-resident State cannot tax the assets of a foreign company that has never reached its limits, it may levy a tax on movable property that is properly and habitually used and used in that State. Thus, although the fact that cars are loaded and transshipped at a refinery in a state outside the owner`s residence does not determine the location of the entire fleet in that state, the state can still tax the number of cars present on average within its borders.71FootnoteJohnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933). Moreover, when assessing that part of a railway within its borders, a State is not required to treat it as an independent line which is considered to operate separately from the rest of the railway. The State may determine the value of the entire route as a single property and then determine the value of the part within the route on a per-kilometre basis, unless there are special circumstances that distinguish the conditions in the different States. Pittsburgh C.C. and St. L.
Ry. against Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894). But no property of an intergovernmental carrier can be considered unless it can be seen in a clear and understandable enough way that it contributes to the value of the road and the rights exercised in the state.72FootnoteWallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920). For example, the ratio of line mileage in the tax state to total line mileage cannot be used to assess the portion of total rail property found in the state when the cost of lines in the tax state was much lower than in other states and the most valuable rail terminals were in other states. See also Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904); Union Tank Line Co.c.
Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919). Or a state property tax on railways, measured by gross revenues allocated to mileage, is constitutional unless it exceeds what would be legitimate as an ordinary property tax assessed as part of a continuance, or is relatively higher than taxes on other types of property.73FootnoteNorth Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929). If a tax receives revenue only from local transactions, the fact that the pay-as-you-go formula does not lead to mathematical accuracy is not a constitutional gap. One hundred from Illinois. R.R.c.
Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940). In May, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Maryland could not impose double taxation on residents by denying them a full credit for certain income taxes paid in other states. In addition, double taxation becomes abhorrent only if the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same authority or jurisdiction of the State for the same purposes, but not in the case where one tax is levied by the State and the other by the city or municipality. (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Phil., Inc.c. Mun. of Tanauan, Leyte, G.R. No. L-31156, 27 February 1976; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Hawaiian-Philippine Co., G.R. No. L-16315, 10 October 1967; Punzalan vs. Mun. Manila Council, 95 Phil. 46 ). (b) In order to constitute double taxation in the offensive sense, the same property must be taxed twice if it is taxed only once. Both taxes must be levied on the same property or property for the same purpose by the same State, government or tax authority during the same tax period and must have the same type or character of tax. (Villanueva vs. City of Lloilo, G.R. No.
L-262521, December 28, 1968.) The Boddie report did not know whether an opponent`s interest in judicial access to a peaceful settlement of a dispute was an interest that was entitled to some degree of constitutional protection as a value of independent value, or whether a litigant should try to resolve an issue that included a fundamental interest in the only forum in which a solution was possible. Subsequent decisions found that the latter response was the decision of the Court of Justice. In United States v. Kras,37 the Court held that charging filing fees that blocked a person in need`s access to debt relief in the event of bankruptcy did not deprive due process or equal protection of the inappropriateness of due process or equal protection. The conjugal relationship in the Boddie case was a fundamental interest, the court said, and after its dissolution, the interests of the association of great importance depended; The interest in eliminating the debt burden and a new beginning in life, while important, has not reached the same constitutional level as marriage. In addition, a debtor`s access to discharge in the event of bankruptcy has not been monopolized by the Government to the same extent as the dissolution of a marriage; One can theoretically and often in reality succeed in solving the problem of one`s debts by other means, such as . B negotiations.. .